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NOTES
THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL:
STATE v. McEL VEEN
Carolyn S. Ostby
No one can possibly know how utterly alone and helpless one
can be when one is a victim of "the law's delay"-except someone
who has experienced it.
from the journals of
Daniel E. McElveen, written
while in the Montana State Prison.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees that in a criminal prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the
right to have the assistance of counsel.' The Supreme Court has
construed this to mean that in federal courts counsel must be pro-
vided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is
competently and intelligently waived.2 This right to counsel was
extended to defendants in all capital cases in state courts in Powell
v. Alabama in which the Supreme Court ruled that the right is
"fundamental" and denial thereof violates the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3 This duty of the state court to assign counsel when the defen-
dant is unable to employ counsel was extended to all felony cases
in Gideon v. Wainwright.'
A concomitant of the right to counsel is the right to effective
counsel. In Powell v. Alabama, Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote:
. . . the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the
failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of coun-
sel was likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 [Emphasis added]
The Supreme Court has not defined the phrase "effective assis-
tance of counsel" in a trial context. Most lower federal courts and
state courts traditionally adhered to the requirement that the assis-
1. MONT. CONST art. II, § 24 and REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 95-1001
[hereinafter cited R.C.M. 1947] also guarantee an accused the right to counsel.
2. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469 (1938).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). This right to counsel was later
extended to any offense for which a person may be imprisoned. Arsinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37 (1972).
5. Powell v. Alabama, supra note 3 at 71.
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tance be so deficient as to render the trial "a farce and a mockery"!
Many courts have now abandoned that highly subjective test and
adopted more rigorous standards.'
Recently, the Supreme Court of Montana considered a case in
which the petitioner alleged he was denied the effective assistance
of counsel. Professing to apply the traditional mockery test, the
supreme court agreed, ordering the district court to set aside the
conviction and sentence. The Montana standard for measuring
effective assistance of counsel remains vague even after the
McElveen decision. This note will review the development of a Mon-
tana standard, briefly identify alternative standards and analyze
the McElveen decision in light of these alternatives.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
The petitioner, Daniel E. McElveen, was charged with one
count of theft in an information filed in the Fourth Judicial District
of the State of Montana. It was alleged that he purposely or know-
ingly obtained or exerted unauthorized control over three trailer-
house tires and rims, valued at more than one hundred fifty dollars
with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property Two ver-
sions of the sequence of events resulting in the petitioner's arrest
were presented at the trial. The state's chief witness, a hitchhiker
who accepted a ride with McElveen, presented one version; the
petitioner, McElveen, presented the other version.
The state's witness testified he accepted the ride with McEl-
veen on the condition that he drive the car. In their subsequent
journey, they stopped at various houses and establishments. The
hitchhiker alleged that at one of these stops, McElveen took the
three tires. McElveen, on the other hand, testified that the hitch-
hiker had the three tires when he was standing by the road awaiting
a ride. When the hitchhiker accepted McElveen's offer, the three
tires were placed in McElveen's car.
Less than one hour after they joined company, McElveen and
the hitchhiker quarreled and parted. The hitchhiker then called the
police to report the stolen tires. The police came to the scene and
located the tires in McElveen's automobile. After the owner identi-
fied the tires, McElveen was arrested.
At the jury trial, McElveen was represented by court-appointed
counsel. He was convicted on the charge of felony theft and sent-
enced to four years in the state prison. Before, during, and after the
6. See notes 17-32 infra.
7. See notes 45-57 infra.
8. State v. vuEliveen, - Mont. - , 544 P.2d 820 (1975).
9. The information charged a violation of R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6-302(1).
[Vol. 37
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RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
trial, petitioner claimed his appointed counsel inadequately repre-
sented him. The district court granted the appointed counsel's mo-
tion to withdraw as attorney of record after the conviction and sent-
encing.
After incarceration in the prison, McElveen wrote a letter to the
Chief Justice of the Montana supreme court claiming that inade-
quate assistance of appointed counsel denied him a fair trial. The
Chief Justice requested the Montana Defender Project to investi-
gate the allegation. As a result of the investigation, a petition for
post-conviction relief was filed in the supreme court. In a 3-2 deci-
sion, the court granted the petition for relief and ordered the district
court to set aside the conviction and sentence without prejudice. 0
Three grounds for lack of effective assistance were presented:
(1) there was a lack of pre-trial preparation and investigation, (2)
there was no trial advocacy, no objections to preserve the record
and, as a result, (3) deprivation of right to appeal. The majority
decision was based primarily on the lack of thorough investigation
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the taking of the tires.
Chief Justice Harrison wrote:
In the instant case the record shows there was little if any attempt
by appointed counsel to substantiate petitioner's version of what
transpired . . .Nor was there an investigation of the police report
as related by the State's principal witness to ascertain its accu-
racy."
In addition to inadequate investigation and preparation, the court
concluded there was ineffective representation during the trial it-
self. Only two objections were made by the defense during the entire
trial. One of the objections, which was sustained, was made by the
petitioner himself to the county attorney's questions regarding the
petitioner's past criminal record. The court specifically addressed
this failure to object:
One of the bases for the necessity of representation by counsel is
to insure a fair trial. Counsel's effectiveness is based on his knowl-
edge and use of the laws of evidence. If the knowledge is not used,
the defendant is in little better position than if he were to defend
himself."2
Failure to object would probably not alone support a finding of
ineffective assistance;"3 not objecting could be part of the "trial
10. State v. McElveen, supra note 8 at 825.
11. Id. at 823.
12. Id. at 824.
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tactics" employed by the defense. The court found in this case,
however, that the tactic employed was "lack of tactics".1 4
This case of apparent disregard of the constitutional rights of
the client may not be "effective representation" by any definition
of the phrase. Yet the test the court applies as a measure of effec-
tiveness is of interest to lawyer and nonlawyer alike, particularly in
this time of increasing scrutiny of the professional conduct of law-
yers.
III. THE MONTANA STANDARD
Many courts have confused the question whether an accused
received the effective assistance of counsel with the question
whether the accused received the assistance of effective counsel. 5
The majority opinion in McElveen identified the issue raised in this
case to be "whether petitioner received adequate representation by
his court-appointed attorney both in preparation and investigation
for trial as well as at the trial"." In thus framing the issue, the court
focused attention on whether petitioner's constitutional right to a
fair trial was denied because of ineffective assistance of counsel and-
not on whether the attorney appointed is generally competent. The
court quoted from a Third Circuit Court of Appeals case to empha-
size this point:
The adequacy of the representation which petitioner received,
which is the only real issue in this case, can only be decided on an
evaluation of the services rendered on his behalf." [Emphasis
added]
All members of the court agreed in McElveen that the test
against which claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are mea-
sured is the "farce and sham" test. 8 Quoting from a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, the court defined this test as follows:
[R]elief from a final conviction on the ground of incompetency or
ineffective counsel will be granted only when the trial was a farce,
14. State v. McElveen, supra note 8 at 822. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals drew
the same distinction in an earlier case: "Appellant does not complain that after investigation
and research trial counsel made decisions of tactics and strategy injurious to appellant's
cause; the allegation is rather that trial counsel failed to prepare, and that appellant's defense
was withheld not through deliberate though faulty judgment but in default of knowledge that
reasonable inquiry would have produced, and hence in default of any judgment at all."
Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 39 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
15. Bazelon, New Gods For Old: "Efficient" Courts In a Democratic Society, 46
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 652, 671 (1971); Comment, Right to Effective Counsel: A Judicial Heuristic,
2 AM. J. CalM. L. 277, 296 (1974).
16. State v. McElveen, supra note 8 at 821.
17. Id. at 822, citing Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 73U, 735 (3d Cir. 1970).
18. State v. McElveen, at 822, 825.
390 [Vol. 37
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RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
or a mockery of justice, or was shocking to the conscience of the
reviewing court, or the purported representation was only perfunc-
tory, in bad faith, a sham, a pretence, or without opportunity for
conference or preparation.'"
Throughout the development of Montana law on this subject,
the supreme court has been reluctant to question the professional
behavior of criminal lawyers. The first Montana case to squarely
hold that representation by appointed counsel was ineffective was
State v. Blakeslee.2 ° The court's remarks in that case were directed
to the duty of the court to make appointment of counsel effective. 2'
The trial judge had appointed new counsel three days prior to trial
without allowing a continuance so that the newly appointed counsel
could prepare for trial. The case did not place the court in the
sensitive position of declaring or even implying that an attorney had
willfully rendered ineffective representation.
Four years later, the court did apply the Blakeslee holding to a
court-appointed attorney, who, "by reason of the dereliction of du-
ties and responsibilities", denied the defendant effective represen-
tation.12 The ineffective representation was rendered on appeal,
however, rather than at the trial level. The attorney failed to present
the supreme court with a proper record on appeal, an error which
became obvious when he later attempted to rely on crucial records
not before the court. The attorney also was tardy in filing other
papers, displaying a general lack of preparation. 23
The mockery test first appeared in a Montana case in State v.
Noller .2 The appellant in Noller claimed denial of effective counsel
primarily because of counsel's failure to object to incompetent, irre-
levent, and immaterial testimony. Applying the mockery test, the
court disagreed with appellant's claim.
In the instant case we will not try to second guess as to what might
have been better trial strategy. Hindsight cannot now be used to
say what perhaps could have been done to achieve a possible but
highly speculative result.2
19. Id. at 822, citing Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 690, 704 (5th Cir. 1965). In West v.
Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 1973), the court rejected the mockery standard and
adopted the McKenna standard. See note 45 infra.
The McElveen decision also cited People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 326 P.2d 457 (1958), to
support its application of the mockery standard. That case has since been modified by People
v. Ibarra, 60 Cal.2d 460, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 386 P.2d 487 (1963). See generally, 9 U. SAN. FRAN.
L. REv. 166, 171 (1974).
20. State v. Blakeslee, 137 Mont. 47, 306 P.2d 1103 (1957).
21. Id. 306 P.2d at 1107.
22. State v. Bubnash, 139 Mont. 517, 366 P.2d 155, 158 (1961). The court also referred
to the Canons of Professional Ethics as standards for defense attorneys.
23. Id.
24. State v. Noller, 142 Mont. 35, 381 P.2d 293, 294 (1963).
25. Id. 381 P.2d at 294.
19761
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This same reluctance to "second guess" defense counsel, or to spec-
ulate on alternative trial tactics appeared in other cases at that
time, the court often noting the vast experience and unquestioned
reputation of the trial counsel. 6
The court later supplemented the mockery test with other es-
sentially negative tests, that is, with definitions of what effective
counsel is not. Effective counsel, for example, does not mean one in
which the defendant has confidence.27 Other negative tests in-
cluded:
Claimed inadequacy of counsel must not be tested by a greater
sophistication of appellate counsel, nor by the counsel's unrivaled
opportunity to study the record at leisure and cite different tactics
of perhaps doubtful efficacy. Success is not the test of efficient
counsel, frequently neither vigor, zeal, nor skill can overcome the
truth."
Only three Montana cases have sustained claims of ineffective
representation. The increasing frequency of such claims apparently
influences judicial attitudes toward the probable validity of the
claim and toward its effect on the legal profession. The Montana
court has been more vociferously defending the reputation of the
attorneys. An example is State v. Perry:
These days [ineffective counsel] is not an unusual charge by con-
victed defendants. . . .Here, two trial counsel adequately repre-
sented defendant. We have scrutinized the record with care and
find defendant was adequately, effectively, fairly, and compe-
tently represented. 29
Montana's application of the mockery test is consistent with
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's decisions °.3  The most recent
Ninth Circuit case on this issue held:
26. Tomich v. State, 141 Mont. 487, 379 P.2d 114 (1963); State v. Callaghan, 144 Mont.
401, 396 P.2d 821, 825 (1964).
27. State v. Forsness, 159 Mont. 105, 495 P.2d 176, 178 (1972).
28. Id. 495 P.2d at 178.
29. 161 Mont. 155, 505 P.2d 113, 116 (1973). In a similar case, the court wrote: "Here
we simply have a new counsel who would have done things differently and who would take
every means to spring his client". Digiallonardo v. Betzer, 163 Mont. 104, 515 P.2d 705, 706
(1973).
30. United States v. Ortiz, 488 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1973); Kendrick v. Nelson, 448
F.2d 25, 29 (9th Cir. 1971); Bourchard v. United States, 344 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1965).
The Ninth Circuit Court affirmed a Montana federal district court case which stated:
"[Clounsel is not to be second guessed on matters of judgment or trial strategy, or even
mistakes..." Application of Tomich, 221 F. Supp. 500, 503-504 (D. Mont.), aff'd, 332 F.2d
987 (9th Cir. 1963). The court granted relief, however, on grounds that "the failure of counsel
to consult with and even listen to petitioner's story, the failure to make a pre-trial motion to
suppress .. .the refusal to subpoena witnesses, apparently without attempt to investigate
. . .and the failure to take an appeal within the time permitted .. .all required a finding
of denial of effective counsel. Id. 221 F. Supp. at 505.
[Vol. 37
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This court will not reverse a judgment of conviction unless a defen-
dant's representation has been so inadequate as to make his trial
a farce, sham, or mockery of justice. . . . We have declined to find
such a "farce and mockery" where counsel's actions or omissions
reflected tactical decisions, even if better tactics appear in retro-
spect to be available."
The only Ninth Circuit case suggesting a higher standard, "reason-
ably adequate professional aid", is the case cited by the court in
McElveen.32 It is possible that this standard will be restricted to
cases involving guilty pleas.
IV. ALTERNATIVE STANDARDS
While the mockery test is not without support in other jurisdic-
tions,3 it is no longer clearly the majority rule. Commentators and
courts are critical of the mockery test for its vagueness, and its
subjectiveness. 34 The standard condemns only the most extreme
irresponsibility of counsel. Sometimes it has not even condemned
the extremes, as in the case of Hudspeth v. McDonald:
The most that can be said for this testimony is that it establishes
that appellee's counsel drank throughout the trial and that he was
under the influence.of intoxicating liquor to a greater or less degree
during the whole trial. But what of it?15
D.L. Bazelon, Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, argues that the mockery test requires such a minimal level
of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth
amendment." Another commentator pointed out the irony of this
non-standard by comparing the test with the tests of competence
established for other professions: "Doctors, after all, owe their pa-
tients much more than a mockery of medicine". 37 He continued:
For fear of lost convictions, indefensible breaches of duty to the
criminally accused have been ignored, the right to counsel de-
31. United States v. Stern, 519 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1975).
32. Wilson v. Rose, 366 F.2d 611, 614 (9th Cir. 1966).
33. See, e.g., State v. Wilkinson, 12 Wash. App. 522, 530 P.2d 341, 342 (1975); Moran
v. Hogan, 494 F.2d 1220, 1222 (1st Cir. 1974); State v. Lopiz, 84 N.M. 805, 508 P.2d 1292,
1296 (1973); Johnson v. United States, 380 F.2d 810, 812 (10th Cir. 1967).
34. Comment, Assuring The Right To An Adequately Prepared Defense, 65 J. CRIM. L.
302, 304 (1974); Comment, Kentucky's Standard For Ineffective Counsel: A Farce and a
Mockery?, 63 KY.L.J. 802, 820 (1975); Comment, The Emerging Right To Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 541 (1975).
35. 120 F.2d 962, 967 (10th Cir. 1941). accord, People v. Gaither, 173 Cal.2d 662, 343
P.2d 799, 804 (1959).
36. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CalM. L. REv. 1, 28 (1973).
37. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation In Criminal Cases: Departures From
Habeus Corpus, 59 VA. L. REV. 927, 928 (1973).
1976]
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based, and the adversary system of justice undermined. Through-
out, the bar has been a silent observer of practice which if
committed by other professionals would produce a host of indig-
nant litigation."
Additional breaks with the mockery standard have been predicted,
based on the belief that when Gideon overruled Betts all justifica-
tion for retaining the mockery of justice standard disappeared."
Recognizing the shortcomings of the mockery test, courts are
developing new tests for measuring effective counsel. Some writers
claim that the difference of language in the standards has meant
little in application." Awareness of the differences in language is
significant, however, because they indicate a trend toward more
rigorous standards for the competence of defense attorneys.
Some courts rule that ineffective counsel violates the four-
teenth amendment only if counsel is appointed. The re-
tained/appointed distinction is usually based on one or both of the
following theories: (1) an agency relationship between attorney and
client, or (2) lack of state action.4' Both theories have been heavily
criticized." Many courts have rejected the latter theory because of
the obvious "action" of state prosecution machinery and state
courts."
Some courts have overcome the state action barrier by asserting
that the representation of the defendant must be so insufficient that
the court has a duty to intervene." If the court failed to intervene
when such behavior rendered the trial a mockery, breach of the
duty to intervene was state action. This theory is related to the
38. Id. at 986.
39. Id. at 932.
40. Flynn, Adequacy of Counsel: The Emerging Fair Trial Issue for the Seventies? 47
N.Y.S.B.J. 19, 51 (1975); Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defenses Representation As A Ground
For Post-Conviction Relief In Criminal Cases. 59 Nw. L. REV. 289, 305 (1964).
41. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Darcy v. Handy, 203 F.2d 407, 426 (3d Cir. 1953);
Roy v. State, 213 Kan. 30, 514 P.2d 832, 836 (1973); Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787,
790 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
42. Waltz, supra note 39 at 293: "The rationale expounded in Mitchell and allied cases
ignores both the logical import and the plain words of Powell." Comment, Right To Effective
Counsel: A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 285 (1974): "Courts refusing to hear
inadequacy claims leveled at retained counsel apply a mechanical criterion founded on some
strained application of a commercial doctrine of agency or on a myopic view of the state action
theory. Neither has any substantial relationship to the Sixth Amendment guarantee as inter-
preted in Powell or subsequent cases".
43. See, e.g., Wilson v. Rose, supra note 31 at 615; Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (5th
Cir. 1966). These decisions have resulted primarily from a series of Supreme Court opinions
identifying a state's obligation to assure a defendant's right to a fair trial. Shelley v. Kramer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
44. See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Kopetka v. Young, 310 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Minn.
1970); People v. Blevins, 251 I1. 381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911).
[Vol. 37
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mockery test and equally undemanding of defense counsel. Both
tests have been criticized as "so much circular verbiage designed to
conceal the completely subjective determinations made by review-
ing courts."45
In 1962, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a slightly
more rigorous standard without expressly rejecting the mockery
test. In McKenna v. Ellis, the court held the right to effective coun-
sel to mean not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective
by hindsight, but counsel "reasonably likely to render and rendering
reasonably effective assistance".46 In that case, the defense turned
on an alibi, yet the obvious witness to prove the alibi was not in
court, and had not been interviewed. The McKenna test has been
criticized as a circular definition of effectiveness, giving the court
no clear guidelines. Several courts, nonetheless, have adopted the
test. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Beasley v. United
States, applied the test to a case in which defense counsel called
only one witness-who happened to be antagonistic to the defense. '
The trial judge allowed the prosecution to introduce damaging evi-
dence of a past criminal record. The defense counsel made no more
than a cursory investigation of the facts. Upon analyzing these facts,
the court joined other jurisdictions in abandoning the mockery test
as a meaningful standard for testing sixth amendment claims. To
further explain its standards, the court added an additional test to
the "reasonably likely to render and rendering" test:
Defense counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with
ordinary training and skill in the criminal law and must conscien-
tiously protect his client's interest, unreflected by conflicting con-
siderations. [citing cases] Defense counsel must investigate all
apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant and
must assert them in a proper and timely manner.48
The requirement of performance at least as well as a lawyer
with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law derives from a
Supreme Court opinion in which petitioner challenged the validity
of a guilty plea partially on the basis of inadequacy of counsel.49 The
45. Comment, Right To Effective Counsel: A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277,
289 (1974). The hazards of court intervention were noted in Elison, Assigned Counsel in
Montana, 26 MONT. L. REV. 1, 21 (1964).
46. McKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 877
(1961).
47. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974).
48. Id.
49. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1969). In a later case, however, the court
refused to find ineffective representation although defense counsel did not confer with peti-
tioner until a few minutes before trial. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970). Bazelon
labeled the Chambers case the "classic case of judicial-ducking-the-issue." Bazelon, supra
note 35 at 21.
19761
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Supreme Court formulated the following standard:
Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable
. . . depends as an initial matter not on whether a court would
retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but
on whether that advice was within the range of competence de-
manded of attorneys in criminal cases. 0
This test was again applied by the Supreme Court to judge the
validity of a guilty plea in Tollett v. Henderson."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a version of the
McMann standard in Moore v. United States: "The standard of
adequacy of legal services as in other professions is the exercise of
the customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the
time and place.""2 Alaska, which initially applied the mockery test,
rejected that test in favor of the "Beasley refinement of the Moore
test."53 Alaska thus adopted a two-pronged approach: (1) the attor-
ney must perform at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary skill in
the criminal law, and (2) the conduct of counsel must have contrib-
uted to the eventual conviction.
The best defined standards are those adopted by the Courts of
Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Fourth Circuit.54 These
courts list the standards of conduct an attorney must meet. Viola-
tions shift the burden to the prosecution to prove the defendant was
not prejudiced by the inadequate representation. The cases adopt-
ing this method also draw on the other standards mentioned above.
Emphasizing that the court does not sit to second guess stra-
tegic and tactical choices made by defense counsel, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that when counsel's choices are
uninformed because of inadequate preparation, the defendant is
denied the effective assistance of counsel.5 Adopting the McMann
standards of "reasonably competent assistance", the court saw no
reason to require less of an attorney when the accused does not plead
guilty. The court added that an additional general guide should be
the American Bar Association Standards of the Defense Function.56
Not satisfied with these generalities, the court said specifically:
50. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 770-771.
51. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973).
52. 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3rd Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225,
231 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973).
53. Risher v. State, 523 P.2d 421, 424 (Alaska 1974).
54. United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d
224 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 849 (1968).
55. United States v. DeCoster, supra note 54 at 1201. This case was reviewed in 12 AM.
CraM. L. REv. 193 (1975).
56. United States v. DeCoster, supra note 54 at 1203.
[Vol. 37
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(1) Counsel should confer with his client without delay and as
often as necessary. . . .Counsel should discuss fully potential
strategies and tactical choices with his client.
(2) Counsel should promptly advise his client of his rights and
take all actions necessary to preserve them ...
(3) Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations both fac-
tual and legal, to determine what matters of defense can be devel-
oped. 7
The Fourth Circuit Court designed a similar list in Coles v. Peyton:
Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as
often as necessary to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters
of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable.
Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and
legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to
allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.58
V. THE MCELVEEN DECISION
This review of the established tests illustrates the difficulties of
the problem. Regardless of enunciated rules, most courts have re-
sorted to a combination of the tests to protect the interests of attor-
ney and accused alike. The McElveen opinion is not an exception.
Certain language in the McElveen opinion suggests a more
rigorous standard which is inconsistent with the permissive mockery
test. The court did not present a list of minimum standards for trial
counsel but it did specify what may be some minimum standards
of performance.
[It is necessary that counsel prepare for trial by attempting to
discover all the facts and circumstances of the crime, including
investigating eyewitness accounts ...
[I1t is incumbent on counsel to make a thorough investigation of
the persons and events involved in the crime."
The inconsistencies are apparent. A trial is not necessarily render-
ened a farce, sham, or mockery because counsel did not make a
"thorough investigation". And certainly many trials have been con-
ducted routinely in which defense counsel did not attempt to dis-
cover "all the facts and circumstances".
Another indication of a more exacting standard is the court's
statement that if the record were not one which might be termed
"open and shut", speculation as to alternative trial tactics "would
57. Id.
58. Coles v. Peyton, supra note 54 at 226.
59. State v. McElveen, supra note 8 at 823. It is well established that the right to
counsel is not a right confined to representation during the trial on the merits. E.g. Moore v.
Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160 (1957); Moore v. United States, 423 F.2d 730, 735 (3rd Cir. 1970).
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not be inappropriate". 0 The McElveen majority did indeed specu-
late as to alternative courses of action the defense attorney could
have pursued:
Although this court disallowed in Noller hindsight as a mechanism
of assessing counsel's professional judgment and tactics employed
at trial, the record reveals a pattern of presentation of evidence
which is not consistent with the theory of the laws of evidence."
VI. THE DISSENT
The dissent in this case deserves special attention. It is based
on two equally faulty notions: (1) that this "stir-wise individual"
was guilty anyway, and (2) that his apparently overbearing interest
in his own defense excused his counsel from adequate preparation
and presentation of the defense.
Although the dissent claims to agree with the law as stated by
the majority, it concludes from the defendant-petitioner's past
criminal record that his "guilt in the instant case is clear beyond
any possible doubt".2 Even if other crimes were a valid basis for
determining guilt, the petitioner's guilt was not at issue in this
case. The majority opinion recognized the constitutional issues at
bar, quoting a provision from the Montana case, State v. Blakeslee:
"This defendant may be as guilty as ever felon not hanged. He is
nevertheless entitled to a trial consistent with our Constitution and
Codes." 3
Unfortunately, Justice Castles and Justice J.C. Harrison are
not alone in harbouring the belief that an accused's "obvious" guilt
justifies denial of reasoned judicial review of constitutional protec-
tions. Chief Justice Bazelon of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals commented on the effects of this belief:
Notions such as "guilty anyway" serve as rationalizations for re-
fusing to confront the deprivation of constitutional rights at trial.
They undermine an important aspect of the appellate court's re-
sponsibility . . . .For example, when we reject an ineffectiveness
of counsel claim because the inadequate representation was not
prejudicial, we conceal a serious problem and nourish the mis-
taken euphoria that our systems for providing counsel to indigent
defendants are alive and doing well. The cost of this concealment
is paid in the loss of fairness to individual defendants and in the
absence of guidance for lawyers in future cases."
60. State v. McElveen, supra note 8 at 823.
61. Id. at 824.
62. Id. at 825.
63. Id. at 821, citing, State v. Blakeslee, supra note 19 at 306 P.2d at 1107.
64. Bazelon, supra note 35 at 28.
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RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL
The second basis for the dissent, the defendant's interference
with trial counsel, is equally ill-founded. The Supreme Court re-
cently clarified the role of the defendant at trial. In Faretta v.
California, the Court held that the sixth amendment does not pro-
vide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants
to the accused personally the right to make his defense. 5 The court
relied in part on an earlier case that recognized the defendant's
power to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers
altogether and conduct the trial himself."
The record indicates that the dissent is mistaken in stating that
the defendant gave his counsel no facts. Even if this were the case,
however, it does not excuse ineffective representation. In
Smotherton v. Beto, the court wrote of this assertion:
It would indeed be an anomaly of the Sixth Amendment were this
court to hold that what a defendant did or did not relate to his
attorney concerning the facts of his case was to be in any manner
determinative of the question of that lawyer's effective representa-
tion of the defendant. A lawyer attends a professional school for
three years; he is instructed in a myriad of legal theories, rules and
rationales, all of which are designed to achieve but one end: the
development of a searching, inquisitive and analytical mind.. .
To commend counsel for trying to defend McElveen as well as he
could"5 offends notions of judicial reason and responsibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
After post-conviction relief was granted without prejudice
prison officials returned McElveen to Lake County to face re-trial.
Upon investigation, McElveen's newly appointed defense counsel
discovered the value of the tires was less than the $150 minimum
for a felony offense. Since McElveen had already been imprisoned
for one year and three months, well above the maximum sentence
for misdemeanor theft, he chose to plead guilty to the misdemeanor
charge rather than await a delayed trial for which he probably
would have been unable to establish a defense; over a year had
passed from the time of his first trial and several potential witnesses
had left the state.
The guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to assure that
our adversary system of justice really is adversary and really does
65. Faretta v. California, - U.S. -, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (1975). In State v. Turlok, 76
Mont. 549, 248 P.169, 175 (1926), the court reached a contrary result, stating that the attorney
has "control and management of the case".
66. Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 95, 106 (1934).
67. 276 F. Supp. 579, 588 (N.D. Tex. 1967).
68. State v. McElveen, supra note 8 at 825.
1976]
13
Ostby: The Right To Effective Trial Counsel: State v. McElveen
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1976
400 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
justice, not to shift the balance against the "peace forces" in favor
of the "criminal element"." Courts and commentators have labeled
the inadequacy of criminal defense for indigents one of the most
serious crises facing criminal law today. Suggested solutions include
personal liability for lawyers70 and specialized education.7 Mean-
ingful appellate review can immeasurably assist in upgrading the
services to indigent defendants. The Montana court took a step in
the right direction in rendering this decision although both crimi-
nally accused and defense counsel would be better served by a clear
definition of the Montana standards for effective representation.
69. Bazelon, supra note 35 at 2.
70. Bines, supra note 36 at 986.
71. Bazelon, supra note 35 at 18.
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